Motivation. Over the past decade, freemium (a combination of free and premium) has become a popular business model, especially among firms that develop information goods such as computer software, online games, applications, and services. In the freemium model, a consumer receives the basic version of a product for free, but can obtain the premium version, which has added features and more functionality, by paying a certain price (Kumar 2014) . This has a huge appeal among the firms in various digital sectors such as Dropbox, Evernote, Asana, and LinkedIn. This model especially dominates the digital gaming market. Rovio's Angry Birds game became an international phenomenon within a year of release and is now the top paid app of all time, having been downloaded more than three billion times (Robertson 2015) . The freemium model is also applicable when the free product is online and the premium product is a physical good (online-offline) (freemium.org 2015). An example of the online-offline variant of freemium is Windowfarms, a firm that sells vertical food-growing gardens designed for homes.
considered either strategic but non-reference dependent consumers (e.g., Cachon and Feldman (2015) , Liu and van Ryzin (2008) ), or loss averse consumers with a single reference point (see, e.g., Özer and Zheng (2015) , Arslan and Kachani (2011) , Nasiry and Popescu (2011) , Zhao and Stecke (2010) ). In contrast to this stream, we consider that each consumer has a stochastic reference level, which belongs to his reference distribution (see, e.g., Baron et al. 2015) . (iii) The third are the works on product versioning in the Information Systems and Marketing literatures. Some of the recent works in this area have considered the related (but different) problem of optimal software versioning with different utility structures (see, e.g., Wei and Nault (2014) , Jones and Mendelson (2011), Bhargava and Choudhary (2008) ). Calzada and Valletti (2012) study the problem of product versioning with the application in Movie industry. Some other recent models have studied some economic aspects related to the freemium business and compared it with other related business models such as bundling (see, e.g., Niculescu and Wu 2014).
Model and Assumptions
Firm. We consider a risk-neutral profit-maximizing firm that offers two versions of a product: a basic version denoted as version L, offered at time t L for free with quality ψ L , and a premium version denoted as version H, offered at time t H ≥ t L at price p > 0 with quality ψ H > ψ L . t H may be also viewed as the end of the trial period. Thus, the consumer tries the free version for ∆ = t H − t L time units, with ∆ = 0 implying that the consumers use the free and the premium versions at the same time. As version L is free, consumers try it before deciding whether to buy version H. If a consumer buys version H, the overall quality he perceives from both versions is: ψ B = ψ L + (1 − s)ψ H , where 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 is the degree of substitutability between versions L and H (e.g., Calzada and Valletti 2012) .
Consumers. There is a random number D ≥ 0, with distribution F (D), of loss-averse consumers who visit the firm to use L. Upon using one unit of L at time t L , each consumer decides whether to buy one unit of H at time t H when the trial period ends. The consumers are heterogeneous in their types (i.e., in the value that they perceive from using the versions given the quality levels). We denote a consumer's type by θ, which is a random variable from a an arbitrary cumulative distribution W (θ). Following Mussa and Rosen (1978) , the perceived value of the version i ∈ {L, H} is v i = θψ i , where v i is a random variable from the (transformed) distribution
), and the expected value E(v i ) = µ i . Upon using version L, each consumer learns the version's true value, v r L , which reveals the consumer's true (realized) type θ r = v r L /ψ L and the true value obtainable from using H, v r H = θ r ψ H . Using this information, the consumer decides whether-or-not to purchase the premium given its (publicly announced) price p. If the consumer buys H, he gains an overall valuation v r B from using both products as
Consumers' Loss Aversion. Consumers using the freemium are loss averse (see, e.g., Mayyasi 2013) (i.e., they feel losses more painfully that equally-sized gains) with a stochastic reference level (Koszegi and Rabin 2006) , which is a random variable from a probability distribution (known as their reference distribution), which represents the consumers probabilistic beliefs about the various possible outcomes for the two versions' realized values and the premium version's availability (before using them).
Consumers' Purchase Plan. In deciding whether to buy version H, a consumer forms a rational strategy that reflects an expectation across possible outcomes of version H's true value and availability. To be credible, meaning the consumer has no incentive to deviate from it, the plan must have a cut-off structure (see, e.g., Heidhues and Koszegi 2014): buy version H if and only if its revealed value exceeds some threshold, v H . The credible value of v H is endogenously obtained in equilibrium.
Market Equilibrium. In the market equilibrium, neither the firm nor consumers have incentive to deviate from their decisions. In particular, the firm wishes to set a price (p) and availability (φ) for the premium version H that maximizes its expected profits while each consumer wishes to find the optimal purchase plan (by finding the optimal purchase value threshold v H ) that maximizes his overall expected utility. (As the consumers are heterogenous, each individual consumer comes up with a different plan.)
Main Results and Their Significance
Some of the important results of the paper, are as follows:
R1. Slightly dissatisfied consumers are more willing to pay. The first result that we show is that when, after using the basic version, a loss averse consumer is slightly dissatisfied (the consumer's realized value from version L (v r L ) falls short but is attainable by buying H), i.e.,
, counterintuitively, he is more willing to buy the premium version H (i.e., the equilibrium purchase value threshold v H reduces) to mitigate the pain of falling short of his initial expectation. In addition, if the slightly dissatisfied consumer has been sufficiently optimistic about the likelihood of buying version H-that is, G H (v H ) is sufficiently high, then he may buy version H at a price higher than its actual realized value, i.e., p * ≥ v r H (despite feeling slightly dissatisfied). The above insights would not hold if consumers were loss neutral. For instance, loss neutral consumers would be less willing to buy version H if the value of version L falls short of expectation, and would not be willing to pay a price higher than the realized value of version H.
R2. Optimal firm policy: Make the consumers slightly dissatisfied. The second result that we show is that the firm's profitability is increased most when the consumers become slightly dissatisfied with the basic version, compared to when they are satisfied (i.e., happy) or entirely dissatisfied (i.e., very unhappy) with it. Specifically, we show that in any of the two other complementing scenarios where the consumers are satisfied (i.e., v r L ≥ µ L ) (i.e., feel happy as the basic version's realized value exceeds what they expected of it), or entirely dissatisfied (i.e., v r L ≤ µ L − (1 − s)v r H ) (feel very unhappy as the basic version's realized value is significantly lower than what they expected of it) they are (i) less willing to purchase the premium, or (ii) pay less, compared to when they are
R3. Increasing the premium's quality may reduce its price. The third result that we obtain is that we show when the price of version H is relatively low (i.e., p * < p), raising its quality level can hurt the firm's profitability. The reason for this behavior is due to the tradeoff between two opposing forces: (i) attachment effect and (ii) comparison effect. An increase in ψ H increases the consumer's optimism about buying
) is increasing in ψ H ). Thus, it increases the consumer's attachment to the idea of buying version H. In addition, the increase in ψ H increases the consumer's expectation of gaining a higher value from H, which means greater pain if the realized value is not high enough. To avoid this pain, he elevates the threshold v H (p * ) for buying version H. The result indicates that, when version H's price is not excessive, the downward pressure on G H (v H (p * )) from the increase in v H (p * ) is stronger than the upward pressure from an increase in the quality level, ψ H . The net result is that the consumer becomes less willing to buy H. To mitigate this negative force, the firm lowers the price.
